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COMMENTS
WHEN LIQUIDATIONS BECOME REORGANIZATIONS:
THE ELEMENT OF "CONTROL"
P RESENT revenue law gives the complete liquidation of a corpora-
tion quite favorable tax treatment.' If a liquidation is carefully
planned, gains from sales of corporate assets during the course of the
liquidation will not be taxed at the corporate level.2 Furthermore
the distributions to shareholders upon liquidation are taxed as cap-
ital rather than ordinary gains.3 Such tax benefits are conferred
on the unstated premise that there is a final separation of the owners
of the liquidating business from the operating assets of the business.
Where the separation is complete, once and for all, there is no diffi-
culty in securing liquidation tax advantages. However, when the
separation is only partial, the owners of the liquidating corporation
will obtain the tax benefits of the liquidation only if they success-
fully avoid having the transactions classified as a "reorganization."
Under the 1954 Code none of the "liquidation" tax benefits accrue
to a "reorganization," the latter being viewed as merely a change in
the form of doing business rather than a termination of the busi-
ness.4 This comment explores the area shown by recent develop-
1 See MacLean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the Sub-
chapter C Advisory Group, 18 TAx L. REv. 407 (1958); Morrison, The Line Between
Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41 TAXEs 785 (1963); Nicholson, Recent Develop-
ments in the Reincorporation Area, 19 TAx L. REv. 128, 124, 127 (1964); Rice, When
Is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation For Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. REV.
208 (1956).
2 Under § 337, added to the Code in 1954, a sale by a corporation of all its assets
within twelve months after adopting a plan of liquidation will produce no recognized
gain on the sale. See BrrrIKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 282-83 (1959).
a INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331; BITrKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 255. See gen-
erally Bittker, Taxation of Complete Liquidation, 8 TUL. TAX INST. 610 (1959); Garver,
Tax Problems in Corporate Liquidations: Liquidations Under Sec. 337, 13 W. RES. L.
REv. 236 (1961); Rettig, Tax Consequences of Complete Corporate Liquidations: Re-
incorporation Hazards, 19 J. TAxATION 130 (1963).
4 See Morrison, supra note 1, at 785-86; Rettig, supra note 3, at 130; Rice, supra
note 1, at 208-09. This has come to be known as the "liquidation-reincorporation"
problem. While the phrase "liquidation-reincorporation" aptly describes the most
common instance where the reorganization provisions may upset otherwise effective
liquidation tax plans, it is to a large extent a misnomer since a number of transactions
classified as reorganizations have no connection with reincorporation. In practice the
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ments to be the most crucial and pivotal in the classification of
liquidations as reorganizations-the stock control which shareholders
of the liquidating corporation have over the ultimate corporate
purchaser of the distributed assets.5
THE 1954 CODE: LIQUIDATIONS AND REORGANIZATIONS
The taxation of corporate liquidations and reorganizations neces-
sarily has dual aspects. A tax may be imposed on the corporation
on gain from the sale of its assets, and the shareholders may be re-
quired to pay a tax on property they receive.
A. Taxation of Liquidations
The approach to taxability of sales of corporate assets incident
to a liquidation has been substantially revised by the 1954 Code.6
Prior to 1954, if the corporation sold the assets, gain clearly was
taxed. The case law was confused as to the effect of a corporation's
distribution of assets in kind which were then sold by the share-
holders. The courts sometimes imputed the sale to the corporation
and taxed any profit as corporate income. Other times they treated
the sale as one by the shareholders, hence no corporate tax was
phrase "liquidation-reincorporation" is used to describe three basic types of transac-
tions: (a) a liquidation of a corporation with distribution of its assets to shareholders
or their nominees followed by incorporation of a new corporation identical in most
respects to the old; (b) the formation of a new corporation owned by substantially the
same shareholders as an existing corporation, with the older corporation then selling
its assets to the new corporation and liquidating; (c) liquidation of an existing corpo-
ration and distribution of its assets to its shareholders who in turn sell, lease, or
otherwise put these assets at the disposal of a new corporation formed at some time
prior to the liquidation, the shareholders receiving stock in the acquiring corporation
in the exchange.
Many possible variations of these basic transactions can be hypothesized: the use
at some stage of dormant corporations, personal holding companies, or trustees,
for example. See Nicholson, supra note 1, at 123-24; Rice, supra note 1, at 209.
5See HOLzMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 3:19 (2d ed. 1955); Goldman, Re-
vised "Reincorporation Doctrine" Upsets Planners: Rev. Rul. 61-156 Analyzed, 17 J.
TAXATION 148, 149-50 (1964); Mayer, Ramifications of the Treasury's Liquidation-
Reincorporation Doctrine, 25 U. PIT. L. REv. 637, 647 (1964); Pennell, Developments
and Unanswered Questions in Corporation Reorganizations, 42 TAXES 889 (1964).
6 Prior to the 1954 Code the Treasury in its regulations provided for nonrecognition
of gain on distributions of appreciated property to shareholders in a complete liquida-
tion. However, where the corporation first sold the assets and then distributed the
proceeds a gain was recognized. See McGaffey, The Rationale and Requirements of
Section 337, 40 TAXES 681, 683 (1962). The early Treasury Regulations were codified
in 1954 in § 336, which provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on property dis-
tributed in "complete or partial liquidation." (Emphasis added.)
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payable.1 Under a new section of the 1954 Code, section 337,8
all sales by a corporation of its assets incident to a "complete" liqui-
dation were made tax free if the distributions to shareholders were
completed within twelve months after adoption of a plan of liquida-
tion.9 A carefully planned and executed liquidation is therefore un-
taxed at the corporate level.
The more important aspect of liquidation tax treatment is the
manner in which the 1954 Code treats liquidating distributions in
the hands of shareholders. As a general rule distributions from a
corporation to its shareholders are taxed as dividends under section
301.10 However, when a corporation undergoes a complete liquida-
tion, section 33111 provides that the liquidating distribution is not
considered a dividend but rather a sale or exchange of stock by the
shareholder. The result is taxation at capital gains, rather than
ordinary, rates.' 2
Capital gains treatment is not the only favorable tax consequence
which may flow from a complete liquidation. Under section 334 (a)
7See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1943), Note, 63 HARV. L.
Rxv. 484 (1950), which imputed a sale by shareholders following liquidation to the
corporation which was required to report the gain on the sale as corporate income.
But see United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 481 (1950).
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337.
"(a) GENERAL RuLE. If
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954,
and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan,
all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets
retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation
from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period."
9 The objective of the 1954 change in § 337 was once and for all to "divorce the
tax consequences of the liquidation-sale combination from the form of 'the transac.
tion." Brxrxt, op. dt. supra note 2, at 290.
1 0 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301 (c) (1).
"That portion of the distribution which is a dividend . . . shall be included in
gross income."
11 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331.
"(a) GENERAL RuLE.
(1) COMPLErE LIQuIATIONs. Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a
corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock."1 2 Capital gains treatment has been justified on the theory that the situation is not
different from the sale of stock and that the treatment should therefore be not differ-
ent from that given the proceeds of stock sales. See S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., Ist
Sess. pt. 1, at 11-12 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 CUM. BULL. pt. 2, at 274. There is a
significant difference, however, between a sale of stock by a shareholder and rcdemp-
tion of stock in a liquidation, since in the latter instance there is no replacement of
shareholders which would leave corporate earnings intact. BITrrER, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 255-56; cf. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1264 (1960 ed.);
Rice, supra note 1, at 210-11.
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it is provided that the basis of property received in a complete liqui-
dation is its fair market value on distribution.13 Thus if a liqui-
dating corporation owns property which it has greatly depreciated
and which has a market value above its adjusted basis, the sale of
these assets in a transaction contemplating complete liquidation will
entitle the purchaser to a step-up in basis.' 4
This favorable liquidation treatment has led to various schemes
whereby a corporation is first liquidated and then reincorporated in
an effort to step-up the basis of the corporate assets at the relatively
cheap cost of a capital gains tax. 5 Quite clearly this is an abuse
of the liquidation tax preference. 16 A second type of abuse has
developed where a corporation has accumulated sizeable amounts
of undistributed earnings that it wishes to withdraw from the corpo-
ration at a capital gains rate, yet without terminating the business."7
A straightforward distribution in the form of a cash payment to
stockholders would obviously result in a tax at ordinary dividend
rates."' But if the assets of the corporation are distributed to the
shareholders in a "complete liquidation" and the operating assets
are then "reincorporated" in a new corporation there is a possi-
bility of having to pay only a capital gains tax on this distribution. 19
B. Taxation as a Reorganization to Mitigate Abuses of Liquidation
Preference
These abuses of the liquidation tax preference by de facto con-
tinuation of the underlying business in a new corporate form pre-
18 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 334 (a); see generally Brrrcx, op. cit. supra note 2, at
255-57, 258-60, 262-63.
4 Brrrara, op. cit. supra note 2, at 259, 262-63, 266; Levin, The Case for a Stepped-
up Basis to the Transferee in Certain Reorganizations, 17 TAX L. REV. 511-12 (1962);
Teschner 9- Sorden, Stepped-Up Basis on Assets Transferred to Newly Formed Corpo-
ration?, 5 J. TAXATION 32 (1956).
10 Cf. James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
'o See Rice, supra note 1, at 209.
'- See, e.g., James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964); David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C.
42 (1962); James C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); see Nicholson, supra note 1, at 123;
see generally Bittker, supra note 3, at 610; Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporation
Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEo. L.J. 96 (1962); Morrison, supra note 1, at 785.
18 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301; see note 10 supra and accompanying text.
I' Were the transaction carried out this openly with the liquidation followed im-
mediately by reincorporation, the plan would in all probability fail, being taxed
either as a "sham" transaction, see note 79 infra, or as a two-step reorganization under
§ 368 (a)(1)(F), see note 45 infra and accompanying text.
To the extent the assets were not reincorporated they would be treated as taxable
distributions either under § 301 or under §§ 354 and 356. See note 37 infra; Treas.
Regs. §§ 1.331-1 (c), 1.301-1 (1) (1955); Brrrx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 262-63.
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sented difficulties long before the 1954 Code. Previously, the Com-
missioner had dealt with this liquidation-reincorporation problem
under the predecessor of current section 368 (a) (1) (D),20 which pro-
vided for the nonrecognition of gain where a corporation transferred
all or a part of its assets to another corporation controlled by the
transferor or its stockholders immediately after the transfer.21 Under
this provision and also by use of the "step transaction" theory22 the
Commissioner found little difficulty in getting the courts to tax
reincorporation after liquidation as a reorganization where stock-
holders of the liquidated transferor corporation "controlled" the
transferee immediately after the transfer.23 But his successes were
20INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112g(1).
2 1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112g(1) provides:
"(1) the term 'reorganization' means . .. (D) a transfer by a corporation of all or
a part of its assets to another corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its shareholders or both
are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred ....
22The "Step Transaction" theory like the "Business Purpose" doctrine, see note 45
infra and accompanying text, and the "Continuity of Interest" doctrine, see note 46
infra and accompanying text, is an interpretative judicial tool used to determine the
true substantive nature of a business transaction for tax purposes. The essence of
the step transaction is that intermediate steps in a series of corporate actions will be
ignored where they lack independent business significance. Weyl-Zuckerman & Co.,
23 T.C. 841 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 232 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1956). The emphasis of
the step transaction doctrine is on the end result, omitting from judicial cognizance
intervening actions. "When we must determine whether there has been a reorganiza-
tion, a sale, or an exchange in a series of transactions, it is proper for us to look at
the beginning and end of the series." William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220, 1225 (1954).
Sometimes the step transaction is used to produce a reorganization, David T. Grubbs,
39 T.C. 42 (1962), and sometimes to defeat a claimed reorganization, Helvering v.
Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1937); ef. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic
Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184 (1941). See generally Paul & Zimet, Step Transactions,
in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDerAL TAxATioN 200-54 (2d Ser. 1938); Manning, "In Pursu-
ance of the Plan of Reorganization": The Scope of the Reorganization Provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 881, 900 (1959); Mintz 9- Plumb, Step
Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. 12TH INsT. ON FED. TAx 247
(1954); Comment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 373, 377 n.17, 386-87 (1964).
23 Under the 1939 Code the courts, with emphasis on the "Business Purpose" doc-
trine, see note 45 infra, and the "Step Transaction," see note 22 supra, struck down
several attempts to gain a tax advantage through liquidation-reincorporation where
control of the reincorporated corporation had not changed. In Bard-Parker Co. V.
Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), the second circuit prevented a step-up in
basis. A net operating loss carry-back was frustrated in Pebble Springs Distilling Co.,
23 T.C. 196 (1954). And an attempt to secure a loss advantage where market value
was less than basis was prevented in Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir.
1947). The emphasis of these courts was on the continuation of the underlying busi-
ness under substantially similar ownership with the only change being in the form
of intervening transactions. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949),
affirming 10 T.C. 1080 (1948); cf. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), rehear-
ing denied and earlier opinion amended, 332 U.S. 752 (1947).
There were some cases, however, which recognized that liquidation followed by
[Vol. 1965:764
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limited to cases where the steps leading to the reincorporation were
so direct as to indicate contemplation of the final result at the time
of liquidation,24 and to cases where shareholders of the transferor
held more than an eighty per cent interest in the transferee.2 5
Because of the difficulties faced by the Commissioner in correct-
ing abuses by invoking the reorganization provisions, the revisers of
the 1954 Code sought a legislative solution.26  They proposed the
addition of a new section27 which would provide for nonrecognition
of gain or loss on the sale of assets by a corporation whose share-
holders "controlled" the purchasing corporation, with control being
defined as the ownership of fifty per cent of the voting stock of the
purchaser.28  Under the proposed section the purchaser acquired the
seller's basis in the assets, hence preventing any step-up.29 This
continuation of the corporation should not always be denied effectiveness, as where
old shareholders had no continuing interest, Fowler Hosiery Co., 36 T.C. 201 (1961),
afJ'd, 301 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1962), or where although there was a transfer to another
corporation in which old shareholders had an interest, the old corporation's business
was not continued. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928).
The trend of the decisions under the 1939 Code met with additional dissents. In
United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953), the Sixth Circuit held
that there was no reorganization because the shareholders of the old corporation
had not bound themselves to carry out any plan of reorganization. Also where the
80%/ control test of § 112 (g), see note 20 supra and accompanying text, was not met,
the Tax Court in Austin Transit, Inc., 20 T.C. 849 (1953) allowed a step-up in basis,
finding no reorganization in the statutory sense. Where the separate transactions
came nine months apart the Tax Court in Charles R. Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C. 1123 (1953),
held that a single plan of reorganization was absent and thus a factor necessary to
activate the reorganization sections of the Code was missing. See Morrison, The Line
Between Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41 TAXEs 785, 791-92 (1963). For con-
siderably more detailed discussion of the authorities under the 1939 Code, see MacLean,
supra note 1, at 408-13, 417-18; Rice, supra note 1, at 211-16.
2 14 E.g., Charles R. Mathis, 19 T.C. 1123 (1953). There, it was established that
the reincorporation was not contemplated at the time of liquidation. The Tax
Court allowed the shareholder-taxpayer to avoid classification as a D reorganization.
"
5 See Austin Transit, Inc., 20 T.C. 849 (1953), involving a sale of assets from a
liquidating corporation to a corporation owned in part by shareholders of the liqui-
dating company. The shareholders owned 45% of the transferee's stock, and the Tax
Court refused to accord the transaction D reorganization treatment. See also Morrison,
supra note 1, at 791; Rice, supra note 1, at 220.
26 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954), which accom-
panied H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). "Your committee's bill . . . also
contains a specific provision designed to make impossible the withdrawal of corporate
earnings at capital gains rates through the device of liquidating the corporation and
reincorporating the business assets, a device which has been sanctioned by certain
courts under existing law." H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
2 See MacLean, supra note 1, at 407; Morrison, supra note 1, at 786; Rice, supra
note 1, at 223-24; see also 2 ALI Fa. INcOME TAx STAT. § X522 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
-'8 Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (c), which set the "control" requirement
at 80% of voting stock and of the total number of all non-voting shares.
20 Compare note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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section could have been most useful in correcting the abuses of the
liquidation preference, but it was eliminated in the final draft of
the Code30 with the comment that any possibility of tax avoidance
by reincorporating a liquidated corporation could "appropriately
be disposed of by judicial decision or by regulation within the
framework of other provisions of the bill."' 1  The only "other"
provisions of the Code that could be adapted to preventing abuses
of the liquidation benefits were the reorganization sections,8 2 which
30 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2543, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). The proposed section, 357,
would have applied in any case where 50% or more of the operating assets of the
liquidated corporation were reincorporated by 50% or more of the shareholders of
the liquidated corporation within five years after liquidation was complete. In the event
of reincorporation, the liquidating distribution was to be taxed as a dividend to the
extent of accumulated earnings and profits unless it could be shown that tax avoidance
was not a principal purpose of the transaction. BNA, TAX MANAGEMENT, MEEMO.
64-22, at 3 (1964).
81 H.R. CoNF. RaP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). "This provision gave
rise to certain technical problems .... [Further,] ... the possibility of tax avoidance
in this area is not sufficiently serious to require a special statutory provision." Ibid.
An attempt was made in 1959 to resolve the reincorporation problem legislatively.
See H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in Hearings Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means on Advisory Group Recommendations on Sub-
Chapters, C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 556, 596-97
(1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings]. See also MacLean, supra note 1, at 407.
The recommended legislation specifically made a liquidation-reincorporation trans.
action applicable where shareholders of the transferor corporation owned 50% of the
transferee's stock, as opposed to the current 80% figure. Proposed Amendment
§ 368 (a) (1) (D) and § 368 (c), 1959 Hearings 596-97. As a complement to this amend-
ment, § 337 was limited so as not to apply to sales or exchanges to which C, D, or F
reorganization provisions applied. Proposed Amendment § 337 (c) (1), 1959 Hearings
596. See also MacLean, supra note 1, at 430-31.
While this proposal was not without its difficulties, it would have dealt with the
bulk of the liquidation-reincorporation avoidance schemes. It was not adopted, how-
ever, and the Commissioner was forced to attempt a satisfactory solution in the
courts. Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?,
77 HAPv. L. REv. 1228, 1243 (1964). See generally Schwartz, Reincorporations Under
the 1954 Code, 15 U. FLA. L. RtV. 159 (1962).
82 The heart of the reorganization sections, §§ 351-68, is § 361 (a), which provides
that "no gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization
exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or
securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization." INT. REV. CODE Or
1954, § 361 (a). This gives nonrecognition treatment to all of the reorganizations
defined in § 368 except § 368 (a) (1) (D), which deals with asset transfers by a corpora.
tion to another corporation controlled by its shareholders. However, § 361 (b) (1)
allows nonrecognition for these § 368 (a) (1) (D) transactions so long as all money and
other property other than stock or securities is distributed to shareholders pursuant to
a plan of reorganization.
The basis of property involved in a reorganization is delineated in § 362, which
provides that the basis of property transferred in a reorganization "shall be the same
as it would be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recog-
nized to the transferor on such transfer." INT. RiV. CODE oF 1954, § 362 (b).
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the Commissioner had been using for this purpose even before the
1954 revision. 38
The Commissioner's most useful reorganization section is 368
(a) (1) (D), commonly denoted as a "D reorganization." In general
terms, it classifies as a reorganization transfers of assets by one
corporation to another, the latter being controlled by one or more
of the transferor's shareholders. 34 Unfortunately instead of strength-
ening the Commissioner's position with respect to D reorganizations,
the new Code made it even more difficult 35 by adding new require-
ments. 36 Under the amended act, before a transaction qualified as
a D reorganization "the stock or securities of the corporation ac-
quiring the assets must be distributed by the transferor of the assets
to its shareholders" in a transaction which meets the requirements
of either sections 354, 355 or 356.37 Thus, the types of stock dis-
tributions which will suffice to confer D reorganization status on the
transaction are the following: (1) Under section 354, the old corpora-
tion transfers "substantially all" of its assets to the new, receives
stock of the new corporation in exchange for these assets, and then
redeems all of its own stock or securities in exchange for the newly
acquired stock;38 (2) Under section 355, an existing corporation dis-
33 See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
8' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 368 (a) (1) (D). For the full statutory text, see note 36
infra.
3r See Mayer, Ramifications of the Treasury's Liquidation-Reincorporation Doc-
trine, 25 U. Prrr. L. REv. 637, 639 (1964); Nicholson, supra note 1, at 127. See gen-
erally, Grubb, Corporate Manipulation Under Subchapter C, Reincorporation-Liquida.
tion, 28 U. CINc. L. REv. 304 (1959).
3 "Reorganization" means: "(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its
assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or
more of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders immediately before
the transfer), or any combination thereof ITS SHAREHOLDERS OR BOTH is in
control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred; OR but only if in pursu-
ance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets are trans-
ferred are distributed in a transaction which qualified under section 354, 355 or
356 ...... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (D). The italicized material was
added in 1954, and the capitalized material was deleted.
37 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.91, at 410 (rev. ed. 1961).
3s " (b) EXCEPTION.-
(1) IN GENmtL.-Subsection (a) (providing non-recognition) shall not apply to any
exchange in pursuance of a plan of reorganization within the meaning of section
368 (a) (1) (D), unless- (A) the corporation to which the assets are transferred acquires
substantially all of the assets of the transferor of such assets; and (B) the stock, securi-
ties, and other properties received by such transferor, as well as the other properties
of such transferor, are distributed in pursuance of the plan of reorganization." INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 354 (b) (1) (A) and (B). (Emphasis added.)
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tributes to its shareholders or security holders enough stock to divest
itself of control of a corporation of which for five years it had held
eighty per cent control; 39 (3) Under section 356, a stock exchange
may qualify under sections 354 or 355 although boot accompanies
the transfer. 40
A DILEMMA IN CURBING TAX AvoIDANCE UNDER THE
REORGANIZATION SECTIONS OF THE 1954 CODE
Under the 1954 Code, the reorganization sections have, as their
primary function, the nonrecognition of gain when changes are
made in a corporation which do not significantly alter the basic
nature of the relationship between the owner and the enterprise so
as to justify taxation of gain resulting from a corporate adjustment. 41
Reorganization provisions are applicable where corporations merge
or consolidate, 42 where the stock or assets of the corporation are
acquired by another, or where the corporation is recapitalized or
merely changes its form.43 Where such changes are for business
purposes" and are accompanied by a sufficient continuity of share-
89 INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 355. Cf. Cordes, Device of Divisive Reorganization,
10 IAN. L. Rlv. 21 (1961); Pennell, Divisive Reorganization and Corporate Contrac-
tions, 33 TAXES 924 (1955).
'
0 INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 356. The term "boot" refers to all property in cash
or kind other than stock and kindred securities. It is derived from the clichd "to
boot," as in "this property and that to boot." William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220, 1226
(1954).
41Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEo. L.J. 96,
107 (1962); MacLean, supra note 1, at 413-17; Rice, supra note 1, at 225-26.
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (b) (1955); BiTxTEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 358.
43INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (A) provides that a reorganization encom-
passes "(A) a statutory merger or consolidation ...."
"' INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) provides that the following shall be con-
sidered reorganizations:
"(B) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of
its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corpora-
tion which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of stock of another corporation
if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such
other corporation (whether or not such acquiring corporation had control immediately
before acquisition);
"(C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of
its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corpora-
tion which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the
properties of another corporation but in determining whether the exchange is solely
for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or
the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded;"
"(E) a recapitalization; or
" (F) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected."
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holder interest,45 the adjustment is tax-free and there is a carryover
of asset basis46 and other tax incidents47 from the old to the new
corporation.
While the reorganization sections serve as permissive methods of
making corporate alterations, they also prevent tax avoidance.4S It
is especially important to preclude two tax-avoidance plans in effec-
tuating this preventive purpose. The first of these schemes is the
attempt to disguise a sale as a reorganization so as to avoid present
taxation.49  The second is the attempt to disguise a reorganization
as a liquidation so as to minimize tax treatment for distributed prop-
erty and to achieve a step-up basis for transferred assets.50
" The "Business Purpose" test was developed in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935), under circumstances where the taxpayers were seeking to gain rather than
avoid reorganization treatment. The Gregory decision made it clear that mere com-
pliance with the language of the statutory provisions was not enough, that there must
be in addition a business purpose for a reorganization. In this regard the decision was
merely a reiteration of the doctrine of disregarding "sham" transactions. See Michael-
son, "Business Purpose" and Tax Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952); Rice,
Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1953); cf.
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (b) (1955).
"0 The "Continuity of Interest" doctrine is analogous to the "Business Purpose"
doctrine, see note 45 supra, in that it antedates the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and
was concerned more with those who were seeking rather than those who were avoid-
ing reorganization status. As its name implies the doctrine requires that there be a
continuing equity interest on the part of the shareholders of the corporation being
reorganized. Cf. Brookes, The Continuity of Interest Test in Reorganizations-Blessing
or Curse, 34 CALi'. L. REv. 1 (1946). Under the 1954 Code the Judicial requirement
of "continuity of interest" has been articulated in the statute, both in the voting
stock requirements of § 368 (a) (1) (B) and (C) and by the control requirements of
§ 368 (c) as incorporated in § 368 (a) (1) (D). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (g) (1955). See
generally BITrKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 357-63; Baker, Continuity of Inrerest
Requirement in Reorganizations Reexamined-the Hickok Case, 18 N.Y.U. 20TH INST.
ON FED. TAX 761 (1960); Tarleau, "Continuity of the Business Enterprise" in Corporate
Reorganizations and Other Corporate Readjustments, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 792 (1960).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362.
"See § 381, enacted in the 1954 Code, which provides for the carryover to the
transferee corporation of the transferor's net operating losses carryover, earnings and
profits, and other tax attributes such as accounting methods and computation of
depeciation. But see § 382 (b) which provides certain enumerated limitations. See
generally the materials in S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 277 (1954); Fager,
Reorganizations: Recapitalizations, Tax-Free Acquisitions, 15 N.Y.U. 15Ta INsT. ON FED.
TAx 413 (1957).
" See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
0 The initial reorganization sections of the Internal Revenue Code were introduced
in the 1921 Internal Revenue Act. See generally SEM-MAN, LEGISLATIvE HIsTORY OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAX Lvs 1938-1861, at 341-42 (1938). See also H.R. REP. No. 486,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. REP.
No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921). The major problem under the 1921 law proved
to be "'the adroitness of attorneys in planning sales in such a way as to come within
the scope of the reorganization provisions.'" SEIDMAN, supra at 340. While it was
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These two tax avoidance problems pose a dilemma for effec-
tive utilization of the reorganization provisions to combat both
schemes. Both sales seeking to masquerade as reorganizations and
reorganizations seeking favorable treatment as liquidations are
treated by the 1954 Code under the same control requirement."'
The impact of the reorganization sections in thwarting tax avoidance
is largely a co-variant of the amount of shareholder control which
necessitates reorganization treatment. Variance of the control re-
quirements poses the dilemma in clearest focus. If a low percentage
of continuing control in the transferee corporation results in a re-
organization, this affords an opportunity for tax avoidance by dis-
guising a "sale" as a reorganization. 52 This scheme is virtually
eliminated by requiring that shareholders of the selling corporation
have a high percentage control in the purchasing corporation.3
However, if a reorganization results only when there is a high per-
centage of control, an opportunity for tax avoidance is afforded in
cases where a mere change in the corporate form is made for the sole
purpose of qualifying for liquidation benefits.54 The smaller the per-
centage control required, the less likely is the possibility that there
will be avoidance by this method, since a larger and larger amount of
"actual" control over the corporation will have to be given up to
proposed in 1933 that the entire exchange and reorganization provisions of the Code,
then § 112, be abolished in order to preclude the prevalent methods of tax avoidance,
this proposal was rejected in favor of amending the provisions. H.R. REP. No. 704,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1934). The 80% control figures set by the proposed amend-
ment were dearly aimed at preventing further abuse by disguised sales. "By these
limitations the committee believes that it has removed the danger that taxable sales
can be cast into the form of a reorganization .... ." H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1934). This amendment is presently embodied in INT. RPv. CoDE oF 1954,
§368.
See Mayer, supra note 35, at 638.
52 See note 73 infra. The 80% requirement of § 368 (c) was first introduced into
the Internal Revenue Code in the 1921 Act. 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921). Minor changes
were made in the 1936 Act intending to assure that "voting stock" meant number
of votes, not number of shares. See SEMMAN, op. cit. supra note 50, at 243.
53 See note 50 supra.
" For example, suppose corporation A has a large amount of undistributed earnings
and profits which it wishes to withdraw. One plan is to distribute the operating assets
and retained earnings and profits to its shareholders and then reincorporate the
operating assets. If the control requirement for reorganization treatment is 80%, then,
so long as the shareholdings of the new corporation include more than a 20% holding
by persons not originally shareholders of corporation A, the reorganization provisions
which provide for nonrecognition of the gain would not apply and the distribution
to stockholders would be treated as a liquidating payment in exchange for stock under
§ 331, hence qualifying for capital gains rather than dividend treatment.
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escape treatment of the transaction as a reorganization. 5 Thus, a
high percentage of control is necessary to curb the sale-reorganization
abuses, while a low percentage is requisite to prevent misuse of liqui-
dation provisions.
When control requirements were first introduced into the re-
organization sections of the Code in the Revenue Act of 192156
Congress was primarily concerned with the sale-reorganization prob-
lems 57 of the reorganization provisions. 58 The result is that while
the reorganization sections are presently well adapted to carrying
out their function of postponing a tax until a gain is realized from
a pure sale, the high percentage requirement limits their usefulness
as deterrents of tax avoidance by liquidation-reincorporation. This
result obtains because the reorganization sections can be avoided by
giving up control of more than twenty per cent of a corporation
organized to carry on the old corporate business, 59 as the current
provisions call for a retention of eighty per cent control before re-
organization treatment is imposed.
-DEVELOPMENTS IMPLEMENTING THE CODE
Regulations
With the 1954 Code amendments further limiting the effective-
ness of the D reorganization, the Commissioner sought to devise new
approaches to combat the liquidation-reincorporation problem.60
Immediately after the adoption of the new Code, two new treasury
regulations were announced. 1 The first of these was Regulation
1.331, 6 2 which attacked the reincorporation problem by limiting the
consequences of complete liquidation to only those cases where a
Or But see BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69
(1932).
50 42 Stat. 230 (1921).
OT See SEIDMAN, op. cit. supra note 50, at 340.
08 In fact, when the present control requirement of 80% was adopted in the 1921
act, § 331 and its attendant problem of avoidance was not yet part of the Code and
obviously could not have been taken into account when the percentage control re-
quirement was fixed. Section 331 of the present Code was first made a part of the
Internal Revenue Code in the Internal Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648 (1936).
"See generally MacLean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Problems of
the Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAX L. REv. 407, 416 (1958).
o See text accompanying note 35 supra.
0I Treas. Reg. § 1.331 (1955) and Treas. Reg. § 1.301 (c) (1955).
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.331 (1955).
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real liquidation had taken place.63 Emphasizing that all steps in a
transaction must be taken into account in determining whether a
complete liquidation under section 331 had in fact taken place, the
Commissioner sought to deny the benefits of complete liquidation to
those who, following a purportedly complete liquidation, continued
the operating business in a new corporate shell with substantially the
same ownership but under circumstances not meeting the restrictive
prerequisites of a D reorganization. 4 The second of the pair of
new regulations was issued under section 301 and took a different
tack. It treated distribution made in connection with a liquidation
as potentially two transactions. 5 Where both stock and other prop-
erty are distributed at the same time and take the form of a liquida-
tion, the Commissioner will look to the substance of the transaction
and treat part of the property distribution as a dividend and part as
a liquidation if the two are in substance, though not in form, separate
transactions. To the extent that such a distribution represents
accumulated earnings and profits, the Commissioner purported to
accord it dividend status.66
These new regulations were intended to accomplish two pur-
poses with respect to the liquidation-reincorporation problem. The
first was an effort to avoid reliance on a D reorganization and its at-
tendant technical restrictions. 67  The second purpose was to avoid
the tax treatment accorded by section 356 to a distribution made in
connection with a reorganization.68 Section 356 provides that where
a" "A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another corporation of all or
part of the assets of the liquidating corporation or which is preceded by such a
transfer may, however, have the effect of the distribution of a dividend or of a trans.
action in which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the extent of
'other property.'" Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1 (c) (1955).
64 Morrison, The Line Between Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41 TAE 785
(1963).
6C Cf. note 22 supra.
66"Transactions treated as distributions. A distribution to shareholders with
respect to their stock is within the terms of section 301 although it takes place at the
same time as another transaction if the distribution is in substance a separate trans-
action whether or not connected in a formal sense. This is most likely to occur
in the case of a recapitalization, a reincorporation, or a merger of a corporation with
a newly organized corporation having substantially no property ....... Treas. Reg.
§ 1.301-1 (1) (1955). (Emphasis added.)
67 See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra: for a discussion of the intricacies of a
D reorganization.
68 "These regulations are in part directed against the provisions of § 356, which
limit dividend treatment on 'boot' received in a reorganizaton to the amount of gain
realized on the exchange." Some commentators feel that § 301 dividend treatment
rather than § 356 boot treatment should be given distributions to shareholders in a
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cash or other "boot" is distributed in addition to stock, the share-
holder recipients are taxable only to the extent of the gain realized
on the exchange.69 However, it is the Commissioner's position,
as reflected in both of the above regulations, that the shareholder
should be taxed to the extent of undistributed earnings and profits
which he receives and not merely on his gain.70 Thus, suppose
that a shareholder's common stock were exchanged for stock and
bonds in a reincorporated company and had a combined value equal
to the shareholder's basis in the old common stock. Where the
bonds represent undistributed earnings of the corporation, under
the above regulations their distribution would be considered a
"separate transaction" and would be treated as ordinary dividend
income under section 301.71 Were the transaction treated under
section 356 instead, there would be no tax presently payable on
either the stock or the bonds since no gain appears from the ex-
change of equivalent values.
Rulings
Following the release of these new regulations the Commissioner
issued Revenue Ruling 56-541l72 in which he detailed his position
with respect to a D reorganization. The ruling involved a baseball
liquidation-reincorporation transaction. Nicholson, Recent Developments in the
Reincorporation Area, 19 TAx L. REv. 123, 129 (1964). See Rice, When is a Liquida-
Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. REV. 208, 227 (1956)
where he suggests that in the case of a reincorporation in which the only effect of
the transaction is a "bail out" of surplus, the courts might be expected to hold that
the property withdrawn from the continuing corporation was taxable under § 301.
Thus the court might adopt an approach similar to Bazley (see note 23 supra) and
hold that a distribution having the effect of a dividend should be taxed as such not-
withstanding the fact that the transaction is cast in the form of a liquidation. See
also Kuhn, Liquidation and Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GEO. LJ. 96,
11I (1962).
INT. REV. CODE, § 356 (a) (2):
"(a) GAIN ON EXCHANGES.-
(2) TREATMENT AS DIvmEND.-If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has
the effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there shall be treated as a dividend
to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as
is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits ....
The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be treated
as gain from the exchange of property."
70 See generally Goldman, Revised "Reincorporation Doctrine" Upsets Planners: Rev.
Rul. 61-156 Analyzed, 17 J. TAXATION 148, 150 (1962).
71 See the example in Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (1) (1955).
72 Rev. Rul. 541, 1956-2 GuM. BuLL. 189, which was revoked by Rev. Rul. 156,
1961-2 Cum. BULL 62. Cf. Goldman, supra note 70, at 150.
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corporation's proposal to sell its assets to a new corporation and then
liquidate. Approximately forty-five per cent of the new corpora-
tion's stock was to be held by ishareholders of the old corporation.
The Commissioner, approaching the question purely from the stand-
point of a D reorganization, ruled that the transaction was not a
reorganization since the eighty per cent "control" requirement 3 had
not been met and it was therefore treated as a liquidating distribu-
tion entitled to capital gains treatment. This ruling was taken by
some observers to indicate that a continuing interest in a new corpo-
ration of less than fifty per cent by old shareholders was not large
enough to result in a denial of liquidation treatment.1 4 This im-
pression of the Commissioner's attitude proved to be mistaken,
however, for the baseball ruling was reversed in Revenue Ruling
61-156.71 This new ruling asserted that where one corporation sold
assets to a newly organized corporation and shareholders of the trans-
feror owned forty-five per cent of the outstanding stock of the pur-
chaser, the other fifty-five per cent having been underwritten to
the public, a liquidation of the selling corporation is in substance
a reorganization76
Quite obviously this bold new position could not be validly
based on a D reorganization theory since the continuing interest
was considerably below the eighty per cent precondition required by
section 368 (c). 7 In justifying the new ruling, emphasis was placed
instead on the E and F reorganization provisions of section 368 (a) (1)
which accord reorganization status to "recapitalizations," (E),78 and
Ys INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (c).
"(c) CONTROL.- . . . the term 'control' means the ownership of stock possessing at
least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock
of the corporation."
7, "The fact that the old shareholders acquired less than a majority interest led
to speculation that the Service was thinking in terms of a 50 per cent control test ...
Nicholson, supra note 68, at 132.
71 Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 62, which revoked Rev. Rul. 541, 1956-2 CuM.
BuLL. 189.
"An adumbration of this change came when the Service announced a new pro-
cedural rule to the effect that there would be no rulings issued concerning gain by a
corporation on sale of its assets incident to liquidation when more than a nominal
amount of stock of both corporations was owned by the same persons. This new rule
replaced a similar rule which had refused rulings where more than 50% of the stock
of both corporations was in the ownership of the same persons. Rev. Proc. 6, 1960-1
CuM. BuLL. 880, which was superceded by Rev. Proc. 32, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 517, which
was superceded by Rev. Proc. 31, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 947.
7 See Kuhn, sura note 68, at 96, 108.
78 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (I) (E), see text quoted note 44 supra.
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to transactions which constitute "mere change in identity, form or
[location] . . " (F).7 9 Unlike a D reorganization, neither the E
nor the F reorganization is subject to the section 368 (c) control
requirements. 0 Also avoided by use of the E and F reorganization
route are the D requirements that the transaction qualify under
sections 354, 355, or 356.81
In seeking to meet the tests of an E reorganization the Com-
missioner drew upon the reasoning of his new regulations,8 2 arguing
that "if the issuance of stock to the new investors is disregarded,
there is clearly a mere recapitalization and reincorporation coupled
with a withdrawal of funds."8 13  Seeking to forestall an argument
that the issuance of stock to the new investors was an essential step
in the overall transaction which would not be disregarded,8 4 the
ruling asserted that the public issuance was immaterial to the
stockholders' "dominant purpose" of withdrawing corporate earn-
ings.8 5
The Commissioner's new approach was an attempt to deal with
the situation where a liquidation was being used in connection with
new financing and where the realities showed that those who con-
trolled the old corporation would also control the new, even though
their percentage interest in the new corporation would not mathe-
matically assure them that control. However sound the Commis-
sioner's arguments were when based on tax equity, his position
was extremely weak when considered in the light of judicial prece-
dent, 6 statutory interpretation,87 and legislative history.88  Although
the position of Revenue Ruling 61-156 has not been changed since
70 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (F), see text quoted note 44 supra.
so Goldman, supra note 70, at 148; Morrison, supra note 64, at 792-94.
8 1 See notes 37-40 supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
8
sRev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 62, 63.
s, See note 22 supra.
s Rev. Rul. 156, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 62, 63. See generally Goldman, supra note 70.
Reliance was placed on Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), and on legislative
intention, H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
s1 For a treatment of the cases arising and decided under the 1939 Code, see note
23 supra and accompanying text.
'7 See Morrison, supra note 64, at 797.
"1 Provisions which would have had substantially the same effect as Rev. Rul. 61-
156 have failed twice to be enacted when proposed to Congress. See H. CONF. REP. No.
2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954); H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26 (1959); cf. Rice,
When is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN.
L. REv. 208, 225 (1956).
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its announcement 9 it has yet to receive judicial support 0 and has
been seriously questioned in recent Tax Court decisions.9 1
Judicial Opinion
The first case to consider the liquidation-reincorporation prob-
lem within the context of the 1954 Code revision was one tailor-made
for a decision favorable to the Commissioner . 2  In David T.
Grubbs93 the Tax Court found a D reorganization when the ma-
jority shareholder of Corporation A formed Corporation B. Corpo-
ration B then acquired ,the assets of Corporation A in exchange for
cash which was then distributed to all shareholders of A except the
majority shareholder in partial liquidation. Subsequently the
former shareholders of A purchased stock in B in roughly the same
proportion they had held in A. Applying the "step transaction"
theory, the court held that the liquidation was merely one step in a
reorganization and that the purpose of the transaction was to enable
the shareholders to withdraw the earnings of the old corporation
without terminating their interest in the business. 94 Since one
hundred per cent of the new corporation was owned by shareholders
of the old corporation, even though there was a slight change in the
ratio of ownership, the control requirements of Section 368 (c) were
fully met.95
The Grubbs decision illustrates and reaffirms judicial willingness
to thwart tax avoidance schemes where the evidence is clear that
the eighty per cent control requirements have been satisfied. 90 But
the decision did little to resolve the more difficult case posed where
19 See BNA, TAX MANAGEMENT 18-2ND PORTFOLIO ON CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS UNDER
§ 337, at 8 (Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited as BNA PORTFOLIO]. See also Pennell, De-
velopments and Unanswered Questions in Corporate Reorganizations, 42 TAXES 889,
898 (1964).
90 See Nicholson, supra note 68, at 138. But see Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner,
345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), reversing in part and affirming in part Pridemark, Inc.,
42 T.C. 510 (1964); Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really
Changed?, 77 HARV. L. R~v. 1218, 1228 (1964).91Reef Corp., P-H TAx Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 65,072
(March 31, 1965); Book Prod. Indus., Inc., P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (P-H Tax
Ct. Mem.) 65,065 (March 25, 1965); James C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); cf. Note,
76 HARv. L. REv. 780, 805 (1963).
12 Pennell, supra note 89, at 899.
39 T.C. 42 (1962).
9 1 Id. at 50.
9039 T.C. at 51. There is some intimation perhaps that a substantial change in
the ratio of ownership might alone be sufficient. "The changes of percentages of
ownership were not substantial and do not avoid the application of the reorganization
statute." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
96 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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actual control is retained but formal control falls short of the eighty
per cent required. Such a case arose in Joseph C. Gallagher,97
involving a Delaware corporation engaged in a stevedoring and
terminal business. Shareholders of the corporation were of two
distinct groupings; those engaged in active management and an in-
active group comprised of estates and widows. A new corporation
was organized by the active members for the purpose of precluding
the inactive group from sharing in the profits of the business. The
old corporation had at this time substantial undistributed earnings.
A plan of liquidation was adopted under which the operating assets
and active contracts were sold to the newly formed corporation. The
old corporation then distributed the proceeds and its remaining
assets to all of its shareholders. The old management group owned
seventy-two per cent of the new corporation, the remainder being
owned by officers and employees presently active in the business but
who did not own any interest in the old corporation.
The Commissioner presented two alternative arguments to the
Tax Court.98 It was first argued that because of the reincorporation
there .was no real substantive liquidation and therefore any distribu-
tions made during the course of the transaction were subject to treat-
ment as dividends to the extent they represented earnings and
profits of the corporation.99 But should the liquidation be con-
sidered complete, the Commissioner argued alternatively that the
liquidation tax benefits should be denied because the liquidation was
either a D, E or F reorganization. 00
The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that no
"real" liquidation took place.101 The court held that the liquidation
here was not a "sham" and it could not be severed as a distinct
transaction 02 so as to permit partial dividend treatment. 03
.7 39 T.C. 144 (1962), 32 U. CINC. L. REv. 416 (1963).
08 39 T.C. at 155-56.
00 See note 155 infra and accompanying text.
100 See notes 36, 44 supra.
20 39 T.C. at 153. "The concept of a continuation of the . ..business through
a section 331 liquidation, coupled with an intercorporate transfer, falls into the general
area of corporate reorganizations, so that it is in the so-called reorganization sections,
if anywhere, that we should expect it to be dealt with." Ibid. The three dissenters
in an opinion written by Judge Pierce disagreed: "Here, there was no actual or bona
fide 'liquidation' of the incorporated business enterprise which had produced the
accumulated earnings and profits. Actually, the business was never wound up or
discontinued ...." 39 T.C. at 167.102 Id. at 160. See notes 45 supra and 151 infra.
103 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1965: 764]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL[
Having dismissed the Commissioner's attack on the substantiality
of the liquidation, the court proceeded to consider whether the
liquidation could be properly classified as a reorganization. 04 The
court first considered the D reorganization and held that where the
continuing shareholders owned only seventy-two per cent of the
new corporation, the eighty per cent control requirement of section
368 (c) barred a D classification. 10 5 The court summarily rejected
the E and F reorganization arguments underlying the Commis-
sioner's Revenue Ruling 61-156,106 asserting that to find an E-type
recapitalization-reorganization the facts must show a mere reshuffling
of the capital structure within a single corporation.10 7 The Tax
Court likewise rejected classification of the transaction as an F type
reorganization, holding that on the facts this was hardly a mere
change of identity.108
There were three dissents in Gallagher, all of which concentrated
on the Commissioner's first argument, based on lack of a complete
liquidation. None of the dissenters quarrelled with the court's
rejection of the Commissioner's E and F reorganization arguments.1 09
20 39 T.C. at 161-62.
101 Id. at 161. In view of the reluctance of the Commissioner to give up his
position in Rev. Rul. 61-156, see note 89 supra, there has been speculation that the
amount of continuing "control" he considers an invitation to attack is any amount
over 20%. BNA TAX MANAGEMENT, MEMO. 64-22, at 11 (Oct. 26, 1964), qualifies its
position by adding the requirement that the 20% ownership must be supported by a
bona fide business purpose. See Nicholson, supra note 68, at 139.
106 Note 75 supra; see BNA PORTFOLIO 7; Lane, supra note 90, at 1256; Morrison,
supra note 64, at 792; Nicholson, supra note 68, at 138.
10739 T.C. at 162. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202-03
(1936), relied on by the Tax Court in Gallagher, where the Supreme Court held
"there was not that reshuffling of a capital structure, within the framework of an
existing corporation, contemplated by the term 'recapitalization.'" Id. at 202. (Em-
phasis added.)
108 39 T.C. at 162.
101The cases under the recapitalization provision E have followed the Supreme
Court's lead in limiting its application to alterations within a single corporation.
Morrison, supra note 64, at 793; cf. Nicholson, supra note 68, at 133 n. 31, and accom-
panying text. As for the F reorganzation it has generally been thought limited in
application to cases of change of corporate domicile or state of incorporation. See
Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 611 (1934); George Whittel & Co., 34 B.T.A. 1070 (1936); Nicholson, supra note
68, at 134 (limited to change of domicile). Paul stated in 1940 that the type F re-
organization (unchanged in form since then) "is so little relied upon by taxpayers
that this part of the statute has indeed perished through lack of use." PAUL, STUDIES
IN FEDERAL TAXATION 82 (3d ser. 1940). Bittker has suggested, however, that it may
"come to play an increasingly important role." BITrKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 383 (1959). In an excellent survey article of the
1954 changes in the Code, Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau 8- Warren, The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations and Reorganizations,
(Vol. 1965:764
CORPORATE TAXATION
There is considerable support for the court's interpretation of
the E and F reorganization sections in Gallagher.110 Thus, while
there may be reason to suspect that the court in Gallagher was in-
fluenced by the "substantial business reasons""' for the transaction
existing aside from tax considerations,"x2 there is little evidence that
the case will be easily distinguished in future situations where less
than the statutory control is present."3
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Cases subsequent to Gallagher have indicated only a reluctant
willingness on the part of some courts to devise alternative ap-
proaches to a D reorganization so as to avoid the eighty per cent
control requirement. Many decisions have steadfastly adhered to
the Gallagher determination."14 Other cases have, however, revealed
that the courts will strain to negate non-control prerequisites to a
reorganization when the required control is present."15
A recent decision illustrating judicial acquiescence in new
methods of achieving a reorganization result by other than the D
68 HARV. L. REv. 393, 420 (1955), it was stated with reference to the F reorganization,
"This provision has always been rather obscure, and its re-enactment furnishes no
clarification as to its content." See also Lane, supra note 90, at 1247. But see SuRREY
& WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1525, 2588 (1960 ed.).
'10 See Lane, supra note 90, at 1243-44; Mayer, Ramifications of the Treasury's
Liquidation-Reincorporation Doctrine, 25 U. PiTr. L. Rv. 637, 650-51 (1964); Morri-
son, supra note 64, at 797; Nicholson, supra note 68, at 134-38; Pennell, supra note 89,
at 898-99. The three dissenters in Gallagher did not quarrel wtih the Tax Court's
rejection of the Commissioner's E and F arguments. Rather, they were of the
opinion that there had not been a complete liquidation in substance. 39 T.C. at 164-
68 (dissenting opinion).
Ma These "substantial business reasons" included: (1) eliminating inactive estates
and widows who held 38% of the stock in the corporation which thereby prevented a
minority 20% shareholder from acquiring control by influence exerted on the inactive
shareholders; (2) allowing eight executives of the business to become shareholders.
39 T.C. at 146-48.
112 Nicholson, supra note 68, at 143-44; Pennell, supra note 89, at 898.
118 See Morrison, The Line Between Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41 TAXES
785 (1963). But see Pennell, supra note 89, at 898, where he expresses the feeling
that Rev. Rul. 61-156 is making headway despite Gallagher.
12, See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), affirming in
part and reversing in part, 42 T.C. 510 (1964); Reef Corp., P-H TAX Cr. Rae. & MEM.
DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 65,072 (March 31, 1965); Book Prod. Indus., Inc., P-H
TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 65,065 (March 25, 1965); Hyman
H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965).
118See Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1960) (exchange); Book
Prod. Indus., Inc., supra note 114 (substantially all); South Texas Rice Warehouse Co.,
43 T.C. 540 (1965) (exchange and substantially all); James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295
(1965) (exchange and substantially all); Roy G. Anderson, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 647
(1964) (substantially all); John G. Moffatt, 42 T.C. 558 (1964) (substantially all).
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reorganization conduit is Pridemark,11 a decision authored by a
Gallagher dissenter.117 In Pridemark, assets of a liquidating com-
pany were distributed in kind to shareholders who immediately
assigned them to a trustee. Within a short time, the trustee acquired
one hundred per cent of the stock of a new corporation in exchange
for part of the assets of the liquidated corporation, whose share-
holders were then given stock in the new corporation by the
trustee."18 The Tax Court held, alternatively, that there was no
complete liquidation both because there was no "true intention to
wind up the business" and that on these facts there was a "mere
change of identity""19 resulting in an F reorganization. 20
N6 cases were cited and no legal analysis was given for the
court's F reorganization holding. Furthermore, no attempt was
made to distinguish the Gallagher decision, which rejected an F
reorganization contention. 21 While Pridemark is distinguishable
from Gallagher on the ground that the statutory control require-
ments absent in Gallagher were present in Pridemark,122 the court's
finding that the transaction constituted an F reorganization is sub-
ject to question.
Considering the Pridemark case on appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision in a recent opinion.123
While the Court of Appeals disapproved the tax court's F reorgani-
zation theory 24 its decision should not be read as a complete victory
for future taxpayers. Referring to the Conference Report purport-
..1 42 T.C. 510 (1964), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
117 Pierce, J. See note 131 infra.
218 The Court of Appeals viewed the liquidation as a "genuine" desire to get out
of the business with a subsequent change of mind, after disappointment in new ven-
tures, and return to the old "business" but with new operating assets (agreements
and salesmen primarily) and in competition with the previously sold business. 345 F.2d
at 42. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
119 42 T.C. at 532.
120 In Gallagher only 72% of the stock of the new corporation was held by old
shareholders, see note 105 supra and accompanying text. In Pridemark 100% of the
stock of the new corporation was held by old shareholders. 42 T.C. at 522.
Prior to Pridemark, the F reorganization provision had been considered un-
important in dealing with reorganizations. See Bixrrc, op. cit. supra note 109, at 383.
1213.9 T.C. at 117.
122 Cf. note 105 supra and accompanying text.
122345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
12'The Court of Appeals quoted Lane, supra note 90, and stated that the F
reorganization has generally been used only where "the transferee [is] no more than
the alter ego of the transferor." 345 F.2d at 42. The court did, however, recognize
that the F type reorganization has recently received increased judicial attention in
broader contexts. Ibid. See note 120 supra.
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ing to authorize some judicial maneuvering in this area, the court
merely held that the facts of this case fail to "bring it within the
reincorporation area because the transactions were not motivated
by a desire to avoid the payment of taxes."125  Furthermore the
court did not reject out of hand as had the Gallagher court the view
that a "complete liquidation" is required to avoid reorganization
treatment.126  The court's test for a complete liquidation was
whether or not the liquidated business was "resumed by the corpora-
tion as a continuation of a going concern .... '"127 Mere compliance
with state liquidation laws is not enough;128 there must in fact be a
complete liquidation. Such a position would appear to be directly
contrary to the Gallagher decision, which denied the existence of
any special factual meaning inherent in the phrase "complete liqui-
dation."'"
While cases such as Pridemark point the way to a solution out-
side the D reorganization, other cases working within subsection D
have sought to deal with the non-control reservations imposed there
and have made significant inroads on their restrictiveness. In this
regard one pair of cases 30 is particularly illustrative. 31 In James
Armour, Inc.,13 2 the taxpayers owned two separate corporations, one
of which rented equipment to the other for use in heavy construction
work. For what were determined to be valid business as well as
tax reasons, it was decided to liquidate the rental corporation after
sale of its assets to the construction company. All of the operating
assets were sold to the construction company except for an office
building, title to which was distributed to the rental corporation's
shareholders and then leased to the construction company. Also in-
cluded in the liquidating distribution was a considerable monetary
sum representing undistributed profits and earnings. The Tax Court
32 45 F.2d at 41. (Emphasis added.)
2
26 Id. at 40-41. This would seem to be renewal of the "continuing interest"
doctrine discussed in note 46 supra.
127 345 F.2d at 41.
1 28 Ibid.
x22 See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
130 Pridemark, Inc., 42 T.C. 510 (1964), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 345 F.2d 35 (4th
Cir. 1965); James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
181 It should be kept in mind that both opinions were written by dissenters in the
Gallagher decision. The dissenting judges in Gallagher were Judges Pierce (opinion),
Raum, and Atkins. Atkins wrote the opinion in Armour and Raum authored Moffat.
12243 T.C. 295 (1964).
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denied the taxpayers capital gains treatment with respect to the
"boot" received and held them taxable under section 356 to the
extent of their gain.133  The court also denied the construction
company a depreciation deduction based on a step-up in basis on the
assets which were purchased from the liquidated company.18 4
The taxpayer in Armour unsuccesfully asserted two defenses.
It was argued first there was no D reorganization because the trans-
action did not embody one requisite of such a reorganization, a
finding under section 354 that "substantially all" of the assets of the
liquidating corporation were transferred to the new corporation.8 5
It was contended that the retention and distribution to shareholders
of substantial cash and an office building precluded such a finding.
The only previous interpretation of the "substantially all" require-
ment as added to the definition of a D reorganization by the 1954
amendments was in John G. Moffatt 36 In that case it was held
that the retention of a few minor items, including land no longer of
any import to the corporate business, did not prevent a finding that
substantially all of the corporate assets had been transferred.18 7
Armour extended this interpretation by holding, in reliance on
Moffatt, that where the purchasing company acquires title to or
use of the assets essential to the operation of the old business enter-
prise there has been a transfer of "substantially all" of the assets
wtihin the meaning of section 354.18 a
It was also argued before the Armour court that a reorganization
was precluded because the technical requirement of an "exchange
and distribution of stock" provided for under section 354180 was not
met. No stock of the purchasing company had been issued and a
fair market value was paid for the assets. The court, however, con-
strued the exchange provisions as requiring only that when the
series of transactions has been completed, stockholders of the old
corporation must have retained their "proprietary interests in the
183 Id. at 310.
131 Id. at 313.
"' See note 37 supra; cf. HOLZMAN, CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATIONS § 3:7 (2d ed. 1955).
'-"42 T.C. 558 (1964).
13 7 Id. at 423. See Roy G. Anderson, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 647. "The fact that
substantially all of the assets . .. were not transferred . . .prevents the transaction
from qualifying as either a subsection C or D reorganization." Id. at 653. See also
James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 308 (1964); Edward H. Russell, 40 T.C. 810, 823
(1963), aff'd, 845 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1965).
38 43 T.C. at 309.
230 See note 37 supra; cf. note 36 supra; HOLZMAN, op. cit. supra note 135, at § 3:5.
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same going business."'140 Support for this construction was drawn
from reorganization cases construing similar "exchange" require-
ments under the 1939 Code141 and holding that no new issuance of
stock was required when it would have been only a "meaningless
gesture."' 42  While it is true that under the 1939 Code "exchange"
was not an integral part of the definition of a D reorganization as
it is under the 1954 Code, since it can be assumed that Congress was
aware of the construction of the word "exchange" this distinction
does not appear to be crucial. Further, in view of the Congressional
exhortation to the judiciary to utilize interpretative powers to frus-
trate tax avoidance 43 it would seem a permissible interpretation of
the intended coverage of the reorganization sections. 44
Armour and Moffatt together indicate a willingness on the part
of the Tax Court to construe narrowly the limitations added by
the 1954 Code to the definition of a D reorganization. 45 Both
decisions further indicate the Tax Court's predisposition to expand
the scope of the reorganization sections where the language is accord-
ingly susceptible. 4 6 The explicit requirement of continuing con-
trol, however, still poses a pitfall. With the expansive interpreta-
tions given other limitations, the element of control is the one
significant roadblock in the path of effective elimination of abuse
in liquidations by use of the D reorganization. 147
An example of the reluctance of the courts to disregard the statu-
tory control requirement is the recent decision of Hyman Berg-
hash,'148 where the Tax Court reaffirmed its Gallagher position in a
situation where less than eighty per cent control was present 49
210 43 T.C. at 308.
24 1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) and (c) (2).
112 Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961). "That an existing corpo-
ration in which the taxpayer was the sole shareholder was used instead of a newly
formed one cannot alter the true nature of the transaction. Here the issuance of new
stock would have been a meaningless gesture ...... Id. at 680.
"s See note 31 supra.
14 See Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?,
77 HARv. L. REV. 1218, 1232 (1964). But see Pennell, Developments and Unanswered
Questions in Corporate Reorganizations, 42 TAXES 889, 897 (1964).115 But see note 131 supra; cf. Pennell, supra note 144, at 899-901.
116 Cf. HOLZMAN, op. cit. supra note 135, at § 3:5, 3:7.
"'1See Mayer, supra note 110, at 647-50; Nicholson, Recent Developments in the
Reincorporation Area, 19 TAx L. REV. 123, 138-39 (1964); Pennell, supra note 144, at
898-99.
18 43 T.C. 743 (1965).
"Old. at 756.
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Berghash and his wife owned one hundred per cent of the stock of
a corporation which operated a single drugstore. Wishing to ex-
pand his operations, Berghash hired Lettman as his general man-
ager with a view to developing another drugstore owned fifty per
cent by Berghash and fifty per cent by Lettman. When this ex-
pansion did not materialize, Berghash agreed to tender a fifty per
cent share in the existing corporation to Lettman. Lettman lacked
funds to purchase a fifty per cent interest, and it was decided that
to consummate this transaction he would purchase for cash one-
half the outstanding stock of a dormant corporation owned by
Berghash and Lettman. Berghash's operating corporation then
sold its operating assets to the dormant corporation in exchange for
the cash received from Lettman's stock purchase, fifty per cent of
the unissued stock and the balance in promissory notes. In this
manner, considerable accumulated profits of the operating corpora-
tion were distributed to Berghash, and Lettman was able to finance
the transaction partially by indebtedness. The Commissioner pre-
sented four theories in seeking to prevent liquidation treatment
but all were rebuffed.lio (1) He claimed that the transaction was
a mere sham, to which the court replied that it appeared bona fide in
every respect and that any scheme to minimize the tax burden was
incidental to the dominant purpose of financing the purchase.151
(2) The Commissioner then argued that the Tax Court's decision
in Pridemark applied and that the transaction was an F reorganiza-
tion.152  In distinguishing Pridemark, the court held to be crucial
the "drastic shift in the proprietary interests."' u (3) The Commis-
sioner's third approach was posited on a D reorganization argument.
Citing Gallagher and refusing to consider each step in the trans-
1'o Id. at 748-59.
15'While reciting Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) and Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) in support of the generally recognized doctrine that sham
transactions will be disregarded, the Berghash court refused to impute a "sham" to
the transactions before it merely because a genuine transaction (one amply supported
by business reasons and possessed of economic substance) was carried out in a manner
achieving maximum tax advantage. 43 T.C. at 749.
12 This was prior to the decision on appeal of Pridernark. See note 123 supra and
accompanying and following text.
1r343 T.C. at 754. The court reaffirmed the rule that where there is a change
in stock ownership, the transaction fails to qualify as an F reorganization. Cf. Joseph
C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Stollberg Hardware Co., 46 B.T.A. 788 (1942); Cush-
man Motor Works v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1942), affirming 44 B.TA.
1288 (1941).
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action separately,'1 the court found the requisite eighty per cent
continuing control absent. (4) Finally, it was contended that no
complete liquidation had taken place. Again citing Gallagher, the
court refused to look beyond the prima facie "actual liquidation and
dissolution."' 55 Berghash therefore closely follows the Gallagher
decision. Its only deviation is its refusal to reject the lower court
decision in Pridemark. Instead, the radical shift in proprietary in-
terest was found to be too great to allow an F reorganization. This
leaves open the question of whether there is some point between
fifty and eighty per cent control where the court will deem such a
transaction a reorganization.
Yet another case strictly adhering to the eighty per cent control
requirement 5 6 is Book Prod. Indus., Inc., 57 which involved an ex-
tremely sizable alleged deficiency, more than two million dollars
arising from the sale of stock distributed in the liquidation of a
close corporation, Middle States, which had previously owned both
that stock and sizable holdings of real estate. On liquidation, cer-
tain real estate which was desirable for a shopping center was sold
by Middle States to a new corporation owned by the wife of its
principal shareholder. Promissory notes and some cash were re-
ceived in exchange for the realty and distributed to the shareholders
of Middle States.
The Commissioner contended that the new entity was merely
a continuing enterprise and that the promissory notes given in
exchange for the property represented, in the hands of former Middle
States shareholders, an equity interest in the new corporation
sufficient to meet the control requirements of section 368 (c) and
hence brought the entire transaction under the reorganization pro-
visions of the Code. The court, however, rejected these conten-
tions.158 With respect to the assertion that the corporation was a
continuing enterprise, thus making the transaction an F reorganiza-
tion, the court distinguished Pridemark (Tax Court decision) on
the ground that less than one-half of the value of the old corpora-
"' 43 T.C. at 756. See note 22 supra for discussion of the Step Transaction.
1; 43 T.C. at 759. See note 101 supra. But see note 127 supra and accompanying
text.
111 See also Reef Corp., P-H TAX Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 65,072
(March 31, 1965).
11 P-H TAx Or. REP. & MEM. DEC. (P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,065 (March 25, 1965).
M~ Id. at 386.
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tion's only operating assets, the realty, was transferred to the new
corporation, all of whose stock was held by new shareholders.' 0
With respect to the contention that equity holdings may be used
in computing continuing control, the court recited as a well-
established rule in the reorganization area that a debt cannot be
equated with a proprietary interest. Gallagher was invoked as
authority for the conclusion that, even accepting the equity argu-
ment, only seventy-two per cent of the transferee would be controlled
by old shareholders of the transferor, a percentage insufficient to
meet the control requirements of section 368 (c). 10 Thus, the rigid
eighty per cent rule remains viable and has withstood all attempted
erosions.
CONCLUSION
Congressional inaction 10' has necessitated imaginative adaptation
of the reorganization sections of the Code to curb abuses of the
liquidation tax preference. Even with such improvisation, in many
respects the reoganization provisions have not proved equal to the
task. Among the impediments to effective utilization of the re-
organization sections, the most troublesome is the problem of control.
The single-percentage system and the unsynchronized dual objec-
tives which the reorganization sections are intended to achieve work
at cross-purposes. A high percentage of control is necessary to curb
avoidance in the sale-reorganization context and a low percentage
is requisite to avert abuse of the liquidation preference.10 2 The best
that can be hoped for within the single-percentage system is the
setting of a percentage which will prevent the grossest and most
flagrant abuses in both areas. There is ample indication that the
present eighty per cent rate, while effective in preventing sales from
masquerading as reorganizations, is of limited effectiveness in curb-
ing reorganizations masquerading as liquidations. 1 3
A realistic appraisal of the situation makes it apparent that while
15 Id. at 288.
This case points up the absence of an attribution requirement in the reorganization
area and the potential abuses which may result by transfers from husbands to wives or
among other related persons. Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§267, 318.1
'6 For a discussion of Book Prod. Indus., Inc. prior to actual decision see Pennell,
supra note 144, at 901-02.
161 See notes 26, 31 supra.
16' See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
161See cases cited note 114 supra.
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legislative action164 is the surest cure for the evils arising from misuse
of the liquidation preference, the proposals which would have
effected such a cure have been repeatedly rejected.165 Perhaps the
Gallagher, Pridemark and Berghash decisions, all of which have been
decided subsequent to the last attempted legislative reform,166 will
be enough to convince Congress that the answer lies in a revision
of the Code and not in ad hoc development in the courts. The
remedies, for the present, however, appear to lie within the existing
framework of the Code and the extent to which the Commissioner
can manipulate and marshal its provisions.167
The judicial response to the Commissioner's current endeavors
has been at best mixed. While the Gallagher decision indicates the
unwillingness of the courts to circumvent the requirement of control,
Armour and Moffatt indicate that the court is at least willing to
either brush the restrictions aside or gloss their impact in an attempt
to curb abuse.
The recent decisions in Pridemark (Fourth Circuit) and Berg-
hash (Tax Court), while resulting in current taxpayer victories,
are perhaps the most promising harbingers of future reorganization
treatment for reincorporations whose primary objective is a tax
advantage unaccompanied by any substantial business purpose.
These cases offer a fertile field from which new doctrine may grow
when abuse proves flagrant. r.h.s.
16- Legislative revision could mitigate the ineffectiveness of the reorganization
sections either by removing the benefits of § 331, limiting the liquidation preferences,
altering the percentage control requirement, or devising new approaches.
15 See note 3I supra.
266 See note 31 supra.
167 See authorities cited note 35 supra.
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